Smith v. Contini by unknown
2000 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-9-2000 
Smith v. Contini 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000 
Recommended Citation 
"Smith v. Contini" (2000). 2000 Decisions. 49. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/49 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed March 9, 2000 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 99-5293 
 
STANLEY SMITH, 
 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT CONTINI; JOHN BARNES; JOHN 
KROMMENHOEK; RICHARD MULLER; JERRY 
MCCORMICK; LAWRENCE MCDERMOTT; JOHN DOE 
(name being fictitious); TEAMSTERS LOCAL 641 PENSION 
FUND; PETER VAN LENTEN; ROBERT CIRONE, as 
Trustee of the Teamsters Local 641 Pension Fund; 
THOMAS FLANNERY, Trustee of the Teamsters Local 641 
Pension Fund 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 97-2692) 
District Judge: Hon. William H. Walls 
 
Argued January 25, 2000 
 
BEFORE: GREENBERG, ROTH, and ROSENN, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 9, 2000) 
 
       David Tykulsker (argued) 
       David Tykulsker & Associates 
       161 Walnut Street 
       Montclair, NJ 07042 
 
        Attorneys for Appellant 
 
 
 
 
       Gary A. Carlson (argued) 
       Lynch Martin Kroll 
       300 Executive Drive, Suite 010 
       West Orange, NJ 07052 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This matter is before the court on an appeal by Stanley 
Smith in this Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. SS 1001 et seq., benefits case.1 Smith 
filed a complaint in the district court on May 23, 1997, 
after the defendants denied him retirement benefits. Smith 
asserted that defendants' construction of the pension plan 
they managed violated ERISA, and thus he brought this 
action seeking an injunction and other appropriate 
equitable relief to bring their construction of the plan into 
compliance with the statute. Of course, his ultimate goal is 
to obtain a pension. 
 
The Teamsters Local 641 Pension Fund (the "Local 641 
Fund") plan is a multiemployer, defined benefits pension 
plan within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. S 1002(2)(A)(37). The 
individual defendants are trustees and officers of the Local 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 
and 29 U.S.C. S 1132(e)(1) and (f). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. The defendants assert that the case is not ripe for 
appellate review because the district court granted summary judgment 
"dismissing the complaint" and not dismissing the action. See Appellee 
Br. at 12 (citing Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Harrison, 907 F.2d 1408, 
1416 (3d Cir. 1990)). While it is true that the dismissal of a complaint 
without prejudice in some circumstances may not be afinal and 
appealable order because a court can grant leave to amend a complaint 
even after dismissal, see id. at 1416, in this case the district court did 
not dismiss the complaint without prejudice and it did not grant leave to 
amend. Moreover, Smith has stood on his complaint. See Shapiro v. UJB 
Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 1992). Thus, we have jurisdiction. 
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641 Fund who, by virtue of their positions, owe afiduciary 
duty to Smith and the other beneficiaries of the Local 641 
Fund plan. 
 
The Local 641 Fund plan provides an array of retirement 
benefits to employees covered by the plan. As is relevant 
herein, the Local 641 Fund pension plan provides for two 
types of benefits to covered employees upon their reaching 
their normal retirement age. The first, a "Deferred Pension," 
is available to employees who accumulate at least ten years 
of vesting service under the Local 641 Fund. See  Local 641 
Fund plan S 3.15, app. at 27. The second, a"Pro-rata 
Pension," is available to certain employees who have been 
members of other Teamsters locals, but did not attain a 
minimum of ten years of employment with employers within 
the jurisdiction of the Local 641 Fund so as to qualify for 
a Deferred Pension. The Local 641 Fund entered into 
reciprocal agreements with the pension funds of other 
locals to provide for Pro-rata Pensions to certain employees 
who then could accumulate service credits in more than 
one fund so as to qualify for a pension. 
 
With respect to its Pro-rata Pension provisions, the Local 
641 Fund plan provides: 
 
       The Fund has a number of reciprocal agreements with 
       other pension funds under which service in the 
       jurisdiction of any of the reciprocating funds is 
       considered as service under this Fund for the purpose 
       of determining eligibility for benefits under the Fund. 
 
       * * * * 
 
       If an employee would meet the eligibility rules under 
       this Plan if his Related Credit was considered, but does 
       not meet the eligibility rules of the last Fund in whose 
       jurisdiction he worked, a Pro-rata pension based on 
       the time worked under this Plan only will be payable 
       even if the Employee has less than 10 Pension Credits 
       under this Plan. 
 
Local 641 Fund plan S 3.21, app. at 28. 
 
Generally, the Local 641 Fund plan calculates a Pro-rata 
Pension based on the amount of the pension to which an 
employee would have been entitled under the Local 641 
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Fund plan if he had earned all of his combined pension 
credits under the jurisdiction of the Fund. See  Local 641 
Fund plan, Addendum A, app. at 37. The Local 641 Fund 
then pays a pro-rata share, or percentage, of the pension to 
the employee that equals the percentage of the combined 
pension credits earned by the employee within the 
jurisdiction of the Local 641 Fund. See id.2 Under this plan, 
however, a Pro-rata Pension generally is paid only to those 
employees who had earned a minimum of 15 years of 
combined service credits. See id. at 28. 
 
As is relevant here, the Local 641 Fund maintains 
reciprocal agreements with the Teamsters Local 202 Fund 
and the Teamsters Local 816 Fund. Under these 
agreements, the Local 641 Fund agreed to apply service 
credits earned by employees with the Local 202 and 816 
Funds toward service credits earned in the Local 641 Fund 
plan. 
 
Smith, who was employed as a truck driver, earned two 
quarters of service credits with the Local 202 Fund between 
May and December 1966. From February of 1967 through 
December of 1973, Smith was employed by Eastern 
Express, Inc. ("Eastern Express") in New York City, earning 
26 quarters of service credits with the Local 816 Fund. 
Then Eastern Express moved to Elizabeth, New Jersey, and 
its employees came under the jurisdiction of the Local 641 
Fund. Smith, whom Eastern Express continued to employ 
after the move, earned 16 quarters of service credits with 
the Local 641 Fund between January 1974 and May 1977. 
 
Pursuant to its reciprocal agreements with the Local 202 
and 816 Funds, the Local 641 Fund accepted the service 
credits Smith had earned within the jurisdiction of those 
funds. Thus, when Smith terminated his covered 
employment in 1977, he had earned a total of 44 service 
credits (the equivalent of 11 years) -- 42 service credits (ten 
and one-half years) as an Eastern Express employee. 
 
On November 11, 1993, Smith, having turned 65, applied 
for a pension from the Local 641 Fund. By letter dated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Apparently the employee obtains the full pension from all of the funds, 
but we are not certain as to the mechanics of the program. 
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June 21, 1994, the Local 641 Fund acknowledged that 
Smith had earned 11 years of service credits, but informed 
him that he needed 15 years of service credits before he 
could receive pension benefits. See id. at 85. Smith 
appealed this decision on the ground that the Fund could 
require only ten, not 15, years of service before an employee 
was guaranteed pension benefits. The Fund denied Smith's 
appeal by a letter dated September 22, 1994. See id. at 86. 
 
Smith then brought this suit in the district court under 
29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3), alleging that the defendants' 
adherence to the 15-year service credit requirement was 
contrary to ERISA and constituted a breach of their 
fiduciary duty. In particular, Smith sought a declaration 
that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duties and 
an order enjoining them to conform the rules and 
regulations of the Local 641 Fund plan to ERISA's 
maximum ten-year vesting requirement. See app. at 7. He 
also sought restitution by the award of a pension. 
 
Ultimately, after proceedings that we need not describe, 
the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. By 
an opinion and order dated April 8, 1999, the district court 
denied Smith's motion but granted the defendants' motion. 
See Smith v. Contini, No. 97-2692 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 1999). In 
its opinion, the district court examined the Local 641 
Fund's pension plan and determined it complied with 
ERISA guidelines. The court noted that the ERISA provision 
Smith thought applicable to this case, 29 U.S.C. 
S 1053(a)(2)(A), required plans to provide that an employee's 
right to his normal retirement benefit be nonforfeitable 
upon the attainment of his normal retirement age, provided 
that the employee have at least ten years of qualifying 
service. See id. at 9-10. But the court determined that the 
Deferred Pension offered by the Local 641 Fund plan 
complied with ERISA's vesting provisions. See id. at 10 -11. 
 
The district court also noted that the Local 641 Fund 
plan provided a pension for those employees who had 
performed less than ten years of vesting service within the 
jurisdiction of the Local 641 Fund, but who had 
accumulated service credits with a reciprocating fund. See 
id. But under the reciprocal pension, an employee would 
not receive any benefits unless he had a minimum of 15 
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years of combined service within the jurisdiction of the 
various reciprocating funds. See id. It is undisputed that 
Smith did not meet that threshold. 
 
The district court concluded that the Pro-rata Pension 
offered by the Local 641 Fund pursuant to its reciprocity 
agreements with other funds was not governed by ERISA's 
ten-year vesting requirements. See id. at 11. The court 
stated: 
 
       Defendants are correct in their argument that ERISA 
       does not require them to provide pro-rata pensions or 
       reciprocal agreements with other funds. Under 29 
       U.S.C. S 1053(b)(1), defendants may disregard years of 
       service performed for an employer during a period in 
       which that employer did not maintain a pension plan 
       with the Local 641 Fund or a predecessor plan. The 
       pro-rata provisions in the Local 641 Fund's pension 
       plan do not violate the vesting requirements of ERISA, 
       29 U.S.C. S 1053(a)(2). Because neither the pro-rata 
       provisions nor the vesting schedule of the Local 641 
       Fund's pension plan violate ERISA, defendants' motion 
       for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint is 
       granted. 
 
Id. at 11. 
 
In addition to contending that the Pro-rata Pension was 
subject to a ten-year maximum vesting requirement, Smith 
argued that the Local 641 Fund should recognize his ten 
and one-half years of service with Eastern Express as 
vesting service under its plan, thereby entitling him to a 
Deferred Pension. The district court found that"[a]lthough 
plaintiff 's argument may have merit, the Court may not 
consider it at this point because it deals with the 
application of the terms of the pension plan to plaintiff, not 
whether the terms of the pension violate ERISA. The Court 
may not consider this argument unless and until plaintiff 
brings an action under 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B) to 
challenge his denial of benefits under the Local 641 Fund's 
pension plan." See id. at 12. Smith appeals. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
We exercise plenary review with respect to the district 
court's decision on the cross-motions for summary 
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judgment. See Seibert v. Nusbaum, Stein, Goldstein, 
Bronstein & Compeau, 167 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 
998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1993). We will affirm only if 
we conclude that the pleadings, depositions, answer to 
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, show that the defendants were entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the undisputed 
facts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
 
We start our discussion of the issues by recognizing that 
ERISA neither mandates the creation of pension plans nor 
in general dictates the benefits to be afforded once a plan 
is created. See Dade v. North American Philips Corp., 68 
F.3d 1558, 1561 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Hlinka v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp., 863 F.2d 279, 283 (3d Cir. 1988); H.R. Rep. No. 
93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4677). Thus, ordinarily only the plan 
can create an entitlement to benefits. Consequently, "we are 
required to enforce the Plan as written unless we can find 
a provision of ERISA that contains a contrary directive." 
Dade, 68 F.3d at 1562. 
 
One of the areas in which ERISA requires express 
provisions in benefit plans concerns the nonforfeitability, 
often referred to as "vesting," of normal retirement benefits3 
payable to an employee who reaches the normal retirement 
age.4 In this regard, ERISA section 203(a), 29 U.S.C. 
S 1053(a), provides in relevant part: 
 
       Each pension plan shall provide that an employee's 
       right to his normal retirement benefit is nonforfeitable 
       upon the attainment of normal retirement age and in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. ERISA defines normal retirement benefits as "the greater of the early 
retirement benefit under the plan, or the benefit under the plan 
commencing at normal retirement age." 29 U.S.C.S 1002(22). 
 
4. ERISA allows the normal retirement age to be defined by the plan or 
sets the age as the later of the time a plan participant reaches the age 
of 65 or reaches his or her fifth anniversary of participation in the 
plan. 
 
See 29 U.S.C. S 1002(24). The parties do not dispute that Smith had 
attained the normal retirement age at the time he requested benefits 
under the Local 641 Fund. 
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       addition shall satisfy the requirements of paragraphs 
       (1) and (2) of this subsection. 
 
       (1) A plan satisfies the requirements of this pa ragraph 
       if an employee's rights in his accrued benefit derived 
       from his own contributions are nonforfeitable. 
 
       (2) A plan satisfies the requirements of this pa ragraph 
       if it satisfies the requirements of subparagraph (A), (B), 
       or (C). 
 
       (A) A plan satisfies the requirements of this 
       subparagraph if an employee who has completed at 
       least 10 years of service has a nonforfeitable right to 
       100 percent of the employee's accrued benefit derived 
       from employer contributions.5 
 
The minimum vesting standards to which an employee 
benefit plan is obligated to adhere are based upon"years of 
service" as defined in ERISA section 203(b)(1). That section 
provides: 
 
       In computing the period of service under the plan for 
       purposes of determining the nonforfeitable percentage 
       under subsection (a)(2) of this section, all of an 
       employee's years of service with the employer or 
       employers maintaining the plan shall be taken into 
       account, except that the following may be disregarded: 
 
       * * * * 
 
        (C) years of service with an employer during any 
       period for which the employer did not maintain the 
       plan or a predecessor plan, defined by the Secretary of 
       the Treasury 
 
29 U.S.C. S 1053(b)(1). 
 
Defendants successfully argued in the district court that 
the Pro-rata Pension provided by the Local 641 Fund plan 
to an employee who had not earned the requisite ten years 
of service credit under its plan was not subject to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The ten-year vesting requirement we set forth reflects the version of 
ERISA section 203 in effect at all times relevant to the instant appeal. 
Because the Local 641 Fund plan was ratified before March 1, 1986, the 
parties agree that the current vesting limits do not apply. 
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ERISA ten-year vesting requirement even though the 
employee overall had more than ten years of service credits. 
Thus, they assert on this appeal that "ERISA's minimum 
vesting standards [i.e., 29 U.S.C. S 1053] do not apply to 
pro-rata pension benefits." See Appellees Br. at 24. In 
support of this argument, defendants cite ERISA section 
203(b)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. S 1053(b)(1)(C), quoted above, for the 
proposition that years of service earned under other plans 
may be disregarded for the purposes of vesting. See id. at 
19-20. 
 
While we seem not to have had the opportunity to 
address the specific question presented on this appeal, in 
Hoover v. Cumberland, Maryland Area Teamsters Pension 
Fund, 756 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1984), in an analysis 
instructive here, we did consider whether pro-rata pensions 
were subject to other limitations imposed by ERISA. In 
Hoover, the plaintiffs, as members of Teamsters Local 453, 
participated in the Cumberland Fund, a multiemployer 
pension plan established by the local union and employers 
engaged in collective bargaining with the local. See id. at 
979. The Cumberland Fund was a qualified plan subject to 
the vesting, funding, and participation requirements of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and ERISA. See id.  Starting 
in 1967, the trucking companies employing the plaintiffs 
began moving their terminals to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 
because of changes in interstate highway routes. See id. 
The drivers affected by these relocations, including the 
plaintiffs, moved with their employers to Pittsburgh and 
transferred to Teamsters Local 249 whose members 
participated in the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and 
Employers Pension Fund (the "Western Fund"). As a result 
of the move, these drivers terminated their participation in 
the Cumberland Fund and joined the Western Fund, 
although the same company continued to employ them and 
they remained members of the same international union. 
See id. 
 
Responding to the disruption in local union jurisdiction 
and pension fund affiliation, a number of teamster pension 
funds prepared a reciprocal agreement which the trustees 
of the Cumberland Fund signed in 1968. See id.  The 
purpose of the reciprocal agreement was to provide full 
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pensions for workers with continuous membership in the 
international union, but who, because of transfers to 
different locals, might not accrue sufficient work credit 
under any one plan to entitle them to full pension benefits. 
See id. at 979-80. Under the reciprocal agreement, a union 
member who transferred from the Cumberland Fund to the 
Western Fund could cumulate his service credit from each 
fund, and if his total combined service credit was sufficient 
on retirement, he would receive proportional pension 
benefits from each fund. See id. at 980. The reciprocal 
agreement did not specify a particular benefit rate, but 
rather required each fund to include in its plan documents 
a method for calculating the partial pensions. See id. The 
trustees of the Cumberland Fund triggered the dispute in 
Hoover by amending the plan in a way that reduced the 
pensions payable from the level in effect prior to the 
amendment. 
 
In response to the amendment, the Hoover plaintiffs 
brought their suit alleging violations of ERISA section 
204(g), 29 U.S.C. S 1054(g). See Hoover , 756 F.2d at 981. 
Section 204(g) states that the "accrued benefit of a 
participant under a plan may not be decreased by an 
amendment of the plan, other than an amendment 
described in section [302(c)(8)]." 29 U.S.C. S 1054(g)(1) 
(emphasis added). Thus, we indicated in Hoover  that "the 
focus of our inquiry is whether the partial pension benefits 
[under the reciprocal agreement involved in that case] 
qualif[ied] as accrued benefits within the meaning of that 
term under ERISA" so that section 204(g) precluded their 
reduction. See Hoover, 756 F.2d at 981. 
 
A reading of both the Cumberland Fund plan and the 
legislative history of ERISA led us to conclude that the 
plaintiffs' partial pension benefits earned pursuant to 
reciprocity clauses satisfied ERISA's definition of an 
accrued benefit. See id. at 982. Accordingly, we determined 
that pension benefits provided pursuant to the reciprocity 
agreements were subject to the section 204(g) amendment 
limitations. See id. It was inherent in our determination 
that the benefits provided pursuant to the reciprocity 
agreements were provided under a covered plan for 
purposes of ERISA because the restriction in ERISA section 
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204(g), 29 U.S.C. S 1054(g), is only on amendments of a 
plan as ERISA defines that term. 
 
ERISA section 203(a) is similar to the ERISA provision at 
issue in Hoover because it sets forth nonforfeitability 
requirements for pension plans. See 29 U.S.C. S 1053(a). As 
in Hoover, we hold that the benefits provided to employees 
pursuant to the Pro-rata Pension provisions of the Local 
641 Fund plan are provided in a pension plan within the 
meaning of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. S 1002(2)(A) (defining 
pension plan as any plan, fund or program that provides 
retirement income to employees regardless of the method of 
calculating contributions, benefits or method of distributing 
benefits). Accordingly, the Pro-rata Pension is subject to the 
vesting requirements set forth in ERISA section 203 and 
thus an employee must be provided with a nonforfeitable 
right to his normal retirement benefit if the employee has 
completed ten years of service. See ERISA section 
203(a)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. S 1053(a)(2)(A). 
 
Defendants' argument that the vesting requirements of 
ERISA are not applicable here because the Local 641 Fund 
was not required to provide its employees with a Pro-rata 
Pension is misplaced. As we mentioned, a plan is not 
required to provide any particular benefits to its employees 
and thus the ERISA provisions become applicable only after 
benefits are provided. See Dade, 68 F.3d at 1562. The Pro- 
rata Pension provision here seeks to provide normal 
retirement benefits to plan participants who reach normal 
retirement age. ERISA sets forth clear vesting requirements 
for the provision of such benefits. See ERISA section 203(a), 
29 U.S.C. S 1053(a). 
 
Defendants argue, however, that even if ERISA section 
203(a) is found to be applicable, section 203(b)(1)(C) allows 
the Local 641 Fund to disregard service with an employer 
for any period in which the employer did not maintain the 
Local 641 Fund plan. We reject this argument. The 
underlying policy goal of ERISA is the protection of 
retirement benefits. Congress's chief purpose in enacting 
the statute was to ensure that workers receive promised 
pension benefits upon retirement. See Nachman Corp. v. 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375, 100 
S.Ct. 1723, 1733 (1980). In constructing ERISA, Congress 
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perceived the statute's accrual and vesting provisions as 
being at the heart of that protection. See Hoover, 756 F.2d 
at 985. 
 
       Unless an employee's rights to his accrued pension 
       benefits are nonforfeitable, he has no assurance that 
       he will ultimately receive a pension. Thus, pension 
       rights which have slowly been stockpiled over many 
       years may suddenly be lost if the employee leaves or 
       loses his job prior to retirement. Quite apart from the 
       resulting hardships, ... such losses of pension rights 
       are inequitable, since the pension contributions 
       previously made on behalf of the employee may have 
       been made in lieu of additional compensation or some 
       other benefit which he would have received. 
 
S. Rep. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4930. 
 
Although the concepts of accrued benefits and vested 
benefits are distinct, the concerns expressed by this court 
in Hoover have force here. In fact, a district court, relying 
on the reasoning of Hoover, recently determined that the 
vesting requirements set forth in ERISA section 203 applied 
to service credits earned pursuant to reciprocity clauses. 
See Helms v. Local 705 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Pension Plan, 
1999 WL 965230, at *10-12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999) 
(finding that plan that offered both a standard deferred 
pension and a pension based upon reciprocity agreements 
was required to adhere to ERISA's vesting provisions for 
both pensions). This conclusion is consistent with our 
reasoning in Hoover and with the concerns expressed by 
Congress regarding the protection of accrued benefits and 
vested rights. 
 
The establishment of reciprocal pension agreements 
promotes transfers of employees between employers within 
funds that are parties to reciprocity agreements and 
provides the employees with the apparent security that they 
will receive a pension based upon their combined years of 
service. See Helms, 1999 WL 965230, at *12. It would be 
inconsistent with the purpose of ERISA to allow funds to 
promote movement by employees in these circumstances 
while at the same time subjecting such employees to 
"penalties" for having so moved. 
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Further, by opting to provide pension benefits based 
upon years or service earned under other funds, the Local 
641 Fund chose not to avail itself of the provisions of 
ERISA section 203(b) for the purposes of the Pro-rata 
Pension. Section 203(b) is permissive in that it states that 
a plan may disregard service with an employer during any 
period in which the employer did not maintain the plan. 
See 29 U.S.C. S1053(b)(1)(C). Thus, ERISA does not require 
a plan to disregard such service. Having chosen to provide 
a pension plan expressly based upon years of service 
earned with certain employers not within the Local 641 
Fund jurisdiction, the Local 641 Fund is barred from 
disregarding those years of service for the purposes of 
vesting under ERISA Section 203(a). 
 
We reiterate that we agree with the defendants and the 
district court that the defendants were under no obligation 
under ERISA to provide for reciprocal agreements and Pro- 
rata Pensions. Nevertheless, once having made the 
determination to provide for such pensions, the defendants 
were obliged to formulate a plan providing for vesting in 
accordance with ERISA section 203(a)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. 
S 1053(a)(2)(A). Thus, this case represents a situation, not 
unusual in the law, that an actor`s discretion in how it 
engages in certain conduct is circumscribed, even though it 
was not obliged to engage in the conduct in thefirst 
instance. 
 
Finally, the defendants argue that they cannot be 
required to grant Smith a Pro-rata Pension because he 
brought this action under ERISA section 502(a)(3), 29 
U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3), rather than ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), 
29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B). See Ream v. Frey, 107 F.3d 147, 
151-53 (3d Cir. 1997). Smith contends, however, that he 
appropriately did not bring this action under 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132(a)(1)(B) because that section applies to actions 
brought "under the terms of the plan" and he acknowledges 
that the defendants acted consistently with the terms of the 
plan. Yet in his view they nevertheless breached their 
fiduciary duties because the plan as written does not 
comply with ERISA. 
 
Our recent opinion in Harte v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. 
98-2052, 2000 WL 225896, at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 29, 2000), 
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supports Smith's position that a fiduciary acting 
consistently with a plan nevertheless may breach its 
fiduciary duty. Smith thus proceeded properly in this case 
under ERISA section 502(a)(3). But we will not linger on the 
question of whether Smith sued under the wrong 
subsection of ERISA section 502, as we expect that the 
defendants now will apply the plan in accordance with the 
ERISA ten-year vesting requirements. Moreover, we would 
be reluctant to order benefits granted, a remedy that might 
be appropriate relief under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), as 
we do not know whether there is any impediment aside 
from the ten-year vesting requirement to Smith's recovering 
Pro-rata Pension benefits. For example, Smith may be 
entitled to a Deferred Pension, and we doubt that he will be 
entitled to obtain both pensions. Of course, in light of our 
disposition, we are acting without prejudice to Smith's 
taking such other steps as may be necessary to recover 
Pro-rata Pension benefits. 
 
In view of our foregoing conclusions, we will reverse the 
summary judgment of the district court to the extent that 
it held the Local 641 plan did not violate ERISA with 
respect to the statute's ten-year vesting requirement. The 
Pro-rata Pension requirements violate the vesting 
requirements by making benefits contingent on obtaining 
service credits beyond ERISA's permitted forfeiture periods 
and defendants have a fiduciary obligation to comply with 
the law. 
 
In addition to arguing that the Local 641 Fund's Pro-rata 
Pension violated ERISA's vesting provisions, Smith also 
contends that by reason of his ten and one-half years of 
service with Eastern Express, he was entitled to a Deferred 
Pension from the Local 641 Fund plan. The district court 
found that while this argument may have merit, it concerns 
the application of the terms of the plan to Smith and not 
whether the terms violate ERISA. The district court 
concluded that such a challenge must be brought pursuant 
to ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B), 
dealing with the denial of benefits, and not in an action 
seeking equitable relief to remedy a breach of fiduciary duty 
under ERISA section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3). We 
agree with the district court on this point and consequently 
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we will affirm the order for summary judgment to that 
extent without further discussion and without prejudice to 
a later action under section 502(a)(1)(B), if that should be 
appropriate. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the order for summary 
judgment of April 8, 1999, will be reversed in part and 
affirmed in part. The district court erred when it concluded 
that the Local 641 Fund plan's 15-year service credit 
requirement for a Pro-rata Pension did not violate ERISA. 
Accordingly, to the extent Smith sought to challenge the 
propriety of the 15-year requirement, this matter will be 
remanded to the district court for the entry of judgment in 
favor of Smith and the fashioning of appropriate relief 
pursuant to ERISA section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3). 
The decision of the district court will be affirmed, however, 
to the extent it held that Smith cannot proceed pursuant to 
ERISA section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3), to assert 
his rights to a Deferred Pension under the Local 641 Fund 
plan. 
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